Skill-biased remote work and incentives. With  Fabio Cerina and Simone Nobili. Click here for the current version of the paper. Submitted.   
Abstract.  We document that performance pay has become an increasingly common element of thecompensation schemes, alongside remote work, especially in high-skill occupations. To explainthese findings, we develop a firm-worker model with moral hazard to highlight how skill levelsinteract with organizational practices. Low-skilled workers face greater uncertainty due to thelow chance of high performance. If risk-averse, they require large monetary premiums so firmsadopt performance pay only if the worker is sufficiently skilled, and fixed pay with monitoringotherwise. The unforeseen pandemic shock, which forced firms to implement remote work, re-duces monitoring effectiveness thereby increasing reliance on performance pay. Post-pandemic,firms persist with remote work when workers are sufficiently skilled for performance pay to becost-effective, while maintaining remote work only if remote monitoring is effective enough. Ourmodel predicts that reduced efficacy in remote monitoring disproportionately limits remote workopportunities for less-skilled workers. To empirically test this prediction, we exploit temporalvariation in remote-monitoring legislation in New York State using a Difference-in-Differencesanalysis. The empirical results strongly support the model’s predictions. Our findings suggestthat pandemic policies and regulations have significantly influenced organizations’ decisions re-garding incentive structures and work arrangements.


Market power and welfare  effects of immigration . With Gianfranco Atzeni, Marco Delogu, and Dimitri Paolini. PDF 
Abstract.    We analyze the effects of migration allowing for endogenous labor supply in a standard two-region model with monopolistically competitive producers and love for variety. We find that the welfare effects of migration depend on firms’ market power in the final good markets. If market power is sufficiently high, migration of low-skill individuals positively affects the welfare of native high skill individuals in the destination region, while low skill individuals are unaffected. Natives of the origin region are always better off, irrespective of their skills. Differently, if market power is sufficiently low, low skill migration makes both high and low individuals native of the destination region better off.

Why are some firms discouraged from borrowing?     With Pasqualina Arca and Gianfranco Atzeni --In progress, 1st draft soon

Financial frictions and business formation in the US economy. With Miguel Casares and  Jose Enrique Galdon  -- In progress